Fuel Exhaustion & Starvation · NTSB ANC17FA018
CESSNA R172K — Nome, AK
| Date | March 6, 2017 |
| Location | Nome, AK |
| Aircraft | CESSNA R172K |
| Purpose of flight | Personal |
| Conditions | Night/Dark · Instrument Meteorological Cond |
| Phase / occurrence | Approach-VFR go-around VFR encounter with IMC |
| Pilot age | 28 |
| Pilot total time | 250 hrs · Low time |
| Time in type | 250 hrs |
| Fatalities | 1 |
Probable cause
NTSB findings
- Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Decision making/judgment-Pilot - C
- Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid level - C
- Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid management - C
- Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of equip/system-Pilot - C
- Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot - C
- Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Airspeed-Not attained/maintained - C
- Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Light condition-Dark-Decision related to condition - C
- Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Ceiling/visibility/precip-Below VFR minima-Decision related to condition - C
- Personnel issues-Experience/knowledge-Experience/qualifications-Qualification/certification-Pilot - F
- Personnel issues-Psychological-Personality/attitude-Complacency-Pilot - F
- Personnel issues-Physical-Sensory ability/limitation-Color-vision-Pilot
What happened
The private pilot was conducting a cross-county flight from Wasilla to Nome, Alaska, at night. According to GPS data, the airplane departed at 1710 and crashed at 2223. The pilot's third-class medical certificate had the limitation "not valid for night flying," but meteorological information for Nome indicated that the end of civil twilight occurred at 2022. Thus, the pilot's operation of the flight after 2022 was not in compliance with his medical certification. The pilot was also not in compliance with the requirement in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.409(a) for airplanes operating under Part 91 to have annual inspections.
The pilot dispensed 35 gallons of fuel into the airplane and fuel containers before the flight. The fuel quantity in the fuel tanks before the flight is unknown. According to the airplane manufacturer's performance charts, if the airplane was filled to the maximum capacity of 52 gallons, it would have had a no-wind range of 505 to 545 nm with 5 gallons of reserve fuel, depending on the engine and propeller settings. The GPS data indicated that the airplane flew a total distance of 518 nm from the taxi to the accident time, which was above the minimum range.
The destination weather forecast product that was available before the flight indicated ceilings as low as 1,500 ft and visibility 4 miles in light snow and mist. The updated forecast that was published during the flight and was valid at the time of the accident indicated a ceiling of 500 ft and visibility of 1 ½ miles. No evidence indicated that the pilot obtained weather forecast information before or during the flight. About 45 minutes before the pilot's expected arrival, a friend at the destination told the pilot that the ceiling was 600 ft in fog, which was below visual flight rules weather. The pilot's text messages revealed that he would continue to the destination because he thought that he could "sneak in." However, the pilot did not have an instrument rating.
Witness statements and an automated weather recording revealed a low ceiling in fog at the time that the airplane arrived in the terminal area. The pilot attempted to land four times but was unable to see the unlit runway through the fog, so the pilot departed the terminal area. A larger, plowed, and well-lit airport was 1 mile away and would have been an appropriate destination for a night flight in a wheel-equipped airplane. Although the specific reasons why the pilot was determined to land at the small, dark, snow-covered destination airport are not known, it is possible that the pilot wanted to avoid detection because of the packaged marijuana that was found in the airplane wreckage.
GPS data indicated that, 8 minutes after departing the terminal area, the airplane slowed to a groundspeed of 35 knots (well below the 54-knot stall speed) at an altitude of 373 ft, and the airplane crashed about 1 minute later. An examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane impacted sea ice in a nose-down spin, resulting in extensive wing leading edge crush damage, which was consistent with an aerodynamic stall at a low altitude and a loss of control.
The fuel tanks had no quantifiable fuel, and the propeller blades lacked chordwise scratches or torsional deformation, which were consistent with an impact due to a loss of engine power after fuel exhaustion. A forced emergency landing on the sea ice would have been possible had the pilot maintained glide speed after the loss of engine power. Also, a suitable airport with good weather conditions was located 60 nm northeast of the destination. Had the pilot elected to divert to that airport before attempting visual approaches in instrument meteorological conditions, the airplane might have had enough fuel to land at that airport.