Piper PA32RT — Poolville, TX

What happened

The pilot and passenger departed on the cross-county flight in visual meteorological conditions. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) and GPS data indicated that, after takeoff, the airplane proceeded east and that, for most of the flight, flew at altitudes that were between 8,500 and 9,500 ft mean sea level (msl). However, as the flight progressed, the weather conditions deteriorated. Toward the end of the flight, the airplane began descending from 9,000 ft msl at a descent rate of about 700 ft per minute. The airplane then entered a descending right turn with a decreasing radius before the ADS-B and GPS data ended. The radius of the turn was initially about 4,000 ft and decreased during the next minute to about 1,000 ft by the final 1 second of the data. As the airplane continued to turn, the descent rate increased; the average rate of descent of the airplane for the final 10 seconds of the recorded ADS-B data was about 12,900 ft per minute.

The airplane wreckage was distributed over a large area with airframe parts located 3,600 ft from the main wreckage location and lighter-weight items from within the airplane located more than 1 mile away. The wreckage distribution indicated that the airplane broke apart during flight and before contacting the ground. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies consistent with a prebreakup failure or malfunction.

Weather data indicated that marginal visual flight rules conditions prevailed across the area with ceilings overcast from 2,500 to 3,000 ft agl. Several weather stations immediately north and north-northeast of the accident site reported instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions to low IFR conditions, indicating ceilings of less than 1,000 ft agl and/or visibilities of less than 3 miles. No breaks in the overcast layer of clouds were reported surrounding the time of the accident, so the pilot's visual flight into IMC would have been conducive to the development of spatial disorientation.

The pilot held an instrument rating, but a review of his flight logbook revealed that he had logged a total of only 2.3 hours of actual instrument flight experience, including 0.2 hour during the 3 months preceding the accident. As a result, the pilot did not likely possess the experience or recency to adequately control the airplane through the use of the instruments in IFR conditions. Thus, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation during an encounter with IMC, which progressed into a graveyard spiral (as indicated by the tightening of the turn) and a subsequent loss of control.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.