CESSNA 182G — Kenedy, TX

What happened

The initial portion of the personal flight was conducted in day visual conditions and appeared to proceed uneventfully. Automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that the pilot initiated an enroute descent beginning about 23 miles from the airport. About 10 miles from the airport, the flight became established on an extended final to the runway. About 3 seconds before the final ADS-B data point, the flight track depicted the airplane entering a left turn that gradually increased to 30° bank angle at the end of the available data. A pilot approaching the airport noted that, when he initially observed the accident airplane, it appeared to be straight-and-level and established on an extended final approach. However, when he saw the airplane a short time later, it appeared to be about 30 feet above ground level and descending in a spin. Surveillance video footage depicted the airplane in a steep nose-down, left-wing low attitude immediately before impact, consistent with an in-flight loss of control. The accident site was located about 0.12 miles from the final ADS-B data point.

A postaccident examination provided no evidence of an in-flight structural failure, an anomaly with the primary flight control system, or a loss of engine power. The examination of the wing flap system was unremarkable with exception of the left flap extension cable. Specifically, at the time of the postaccident examination, the swaged cable end of the left flap extension cable was separated with the cable disengaged from the drive pulley. The separated cable end could not be located, which prevented further examination. Although an impression from the flap extension cable along the radius and a witness mark from the cable end washer were observed on the drive pulley, the investigation was not able to determine if those features were formed during normal operation or during the accident sequence.

The pilot's autopsy identified focally severe coronary artery disease, which conveyed an increased risk of a sudden impairing or incapacitating cardiac event such as abnormal heartbeat, heart attack, or chest pain. There was no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred, although such an event does not reliably leave autopsy evidence if it occurs just before death. Despite the risk it conveys, coronary artery disease often does not produce significant symptoms. The circumstances of the accident neither exclude nor clearly indicate a sudden medical event. Thus, whether the pilot's coronary artery disease contributed to the accident cannot be determined.

The pilot had a history of mild depression and anxiety that had been waivered by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Documentation in her FAA records, as of about 5 months before the crash date, indicated that her depression and anxiety were well controlled on a sertraline regimen that had been stable since February 2020, without adverse side effects or neurocognitive deficits. Her postmortem toxicology results were consistent with continued use of sertraline. It is unlikely that the pilot's history of mild anxiety and depression or her use of sertraline contributed to the crash.

Based on the available information, the airplane was under control and above aerodynamic stall airspeed until the end of the available ADS-B data. Whether or not the left wing flap extension cable end separated in-flight or during the impact sequence could not be determined because the cable end was not found. An in-flight separation of the left flap extension cable end would have resulted in a partial retraction of the left flap due to normal aerodynamic forces. The resulting aerodynamic asymmetry caused by a partially retracted left flap and a fully extended right flap would have induced a rolling tendency and could explain the gradual left turn as observed in the ADS-B data; this rolling tendency would have required prompt attention from the pilot to maintain control of the airplane. Ultimately, the cause of the loss of airplane control could not be determined with the available information.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.