LANCAIR LEGACY FG — Spicewood, TX

What happened

Witnesses reported that, during the pilot’s initial approach for landing on runway 17, the experimental airplane was fast, encountered a wind gust, and ballooned, prompting the pilot to initiate a go-around. During the subsequent approach, one witness observed the nose landing gear nearly contact the runway. The pilot again initiated a go-around, during which the airplane entered a steep, left-turning climb before descending nose-down into terrain. A postimpact fire consumed most of the airplane.

The recorded wind conditions at a nearby airport about 10 minutes after the accident were from 170° at 6 knots (kts) with gusts to 15 kts. An observation recorded about 10 minutes before the accident included wind from 180°, variable between 140° and 220°, at 6 kts with gusts to 14 kts.

Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The engine displayed internal continuity and signs of producing power at impact, and propeller damage was also consistent with power being produced at the time of impact. The flap actuator position corresponded to full flap extension (40°); however, the airplane’s go-around procedure specified reducing the flap extension to 20° after applying power and establishing the climb.

Toxicology testing detected the over-the-counter antihistamine cetirizine at levels unlikely to have caused significant impairment. Autopsy findings identified significant coronary artery disease that put the pilot at an increased risk of a sudden impairing or incapacitating cardiac event, including angina, arrhythmia, or heart attack. There is no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred; however, such an event does not leave reliable autopsy evidence if it occurs immediately before death. No evidence of an acute medical event was identified.

Given the position of the flap actuator as found at the accident site, it is likely that the pilot failed to retract the flaps during the go-around as prescribed by the pilot’s operating handbook, which likely significantly reduced the climb performance of the airplane. It is also likely that the pilot subsequently exceeded the airplane’s critical angle of attack during the attempted go-around with the flaps fully extended, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of airplane control at an altitude that was too low for recovery.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.