Undetermined · NTSB ERA09LA469
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY 58 — Teterboro, NJ
| Date | August 21, 2009 |
| Location | Teterboro, NJ |
| Aircraft | RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY 58 |
| Purpose of flight | Executive/Corporate |
| Conditions | Night · Visual Meteorological Cond |
| Phase / occurrence | Approach-VFR pattern final Engine shutdown |
| Pilot age | 54 |
| Pilot total time | 15,628 hrs · High time |
| Time in type | 2,241 hrs |
| Fatalities | 1, 1 serious |
Probable cause
NTSB findings
- Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Incorrect action performance-Copilot - C
- Aircraft-Aircraft propeller/rotor-Propeller system-Propeller feather/reversing-Unintentional use/operation - C
- Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Airspeed-Incorrect use/operation - C
- Organizational issues-Management-Policy/procedure-Adequacy of policy/proc-Operator - F
- Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Identification/recognition-Flight crew - C
What happened
The airplane was operating as a corporate flight transporting medical specimens on a night, visual approach in visual meteorological conditions when the accident occurred. The flight was scheduled to be a single-pilot operation conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, and the pilot-in-command (PIC) had been assigned to the flight. Although the second-in-command (SIC), also a Quest Diagnostics pilot, was not assigned to the flight, he asked the PIC if he could accompany him on the flight to gain familiarization with operations into Teterboro Airport. Typically, the PIC flies the airplane from the left seat; however, the PIC on this flight allowed the SIC to occupy the left seat and fly the airplane. The investigation could not determine if the pilots had coordinated responsibilities for the flight before departure or if the PIC was providing additional training to the SIC during the flight.
Radar data indicated that, while on the base leg of the traffic pattern, the airplane had an airspeed of about 204 knots, which exceeded the maximum flap extension speed by more than 50 knots and the maximum landing gear extension speed by more than 80 knots. According to the SIC, during this critical portion of the approach to landing, the nonflying PIC remained focused on providing familiarization of the airport and city environment to the SIC, who was flying the airplane, and the PIC failed to monitor the airplane’s airspeed. After the SIC recognized the airplane’s excessive approach speed close to the runway environment, he attempted to slow the airplane. However, he inadvertently retarded the propeller levers and feathered the propellers instead of retarding the throttle levers. Recognizing the resultant loss of thrust, the PIC challenged the SIC’s actions and stated that both engines had experienced power loss. The airplane’s unfeathering accumulators had been removed; therefore, it was not possible for either pilot to quickly unfeather the propellers and reestablish engine power. Approaching the runway centerline at both low altitude and high airspeed and with the propellers feathered, the pilots were unable to slow the airplane and descend before overflying the runway. The airplane crossed the runway threshold at 300 feet and 186 knots (90 knots more than the approach speed of 96 knots), departed airport property, struck objects, and burst into flames.
Chairman Hersman and Member Rosekind did not approve this brief. Chairman Hersman filed a dissenting statement, which Member Rosekind joined. Member Rosekind filed a dissenting statement, which Chairman Hersman joined. Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement, which Vice Chairman Hart and Member Weener joined. The statements can be found in the public docket for this accident.