VFR into IMC · NTSB ERA10FA062

PIPER PA-28R-200 — Dennisville, NJ

2 fatal IMC
DateNovember 14, 2009
LocationDennisville, NJ
AircraftPIPER PA-28R-200
Purpose of flightPersonal
ConditionsDay · Instrument Meteorological Cond
Phase / occurrencePrior to flight Preflight or dispatch event
Pilot age53
Pilot total time395 hrs · Building experience
Time in type308 hrs
Fatalities2

Probable cause

The non-instrument-rated pilot's decision to depart into known instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in his spatial disorientation and overcontrol of the airplane and the subsequent in-flight structural failure. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to use all available resources, including the autopilot and the air traffic controller.

NTSB findings

  • Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Decision making/judgment-Pilot - C
  • Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot - C
  • Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of available resources-Pilot - F
  • Personnel issues-Experience/knowledge-Experience/qualifications-Qualification/certification-Pilot
  • Personnel issues-Psychological-Perception/orientation/illusio-Spatial disorientation-Pilot - C

What happened

The non-instrument-rated private pilot/owner of the airplane had longstanding arrangements for the trip to his destination, which was about 500 miles east of where he lived and based his airplane. He originally planned to depart on Thursday morning, but instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at the airport prevented him from leaving on Thursday or Friday. On Saturday morning, IMC still prevailed. Several witnesses observed the pilot and his son at the fuel dock, and all assumed that he would then taxi back to his hangar since the ceilings were between 200 and 400 feet above ground level. Instead, the airplane departed and disappeared from view into the overcast clouds. The pilot initially squawked the visual flight rules (VFR) code of 1200 on his transponder, but then contacted an air traffic controller for flight advisories. The controller assigned a discrete transponder code, and instructed the pilot to maintain VFR. For the next 7 minutes, multiple witnesses on and near the airport heard the airplane in their vicinity. All reported that it sounded like the airplane was continuously changing speed, direction, or both. Several witnesses then heard the airplane impact the ground. Airplane components were found in two locations: at the main wreckage site and along a debris path that consisted of the outboard portions of the left wing and left stabilator. Physical evidence indicated that the wing failed in the positive direction due to airloads and not due to any preseparation mechanical deficiencies. No other evidence of any preimpact component deficiencies or failures was discovered and examination of the wreckage and ground scars indicated that the engine was developing power at impact.

Discussions with the pilot's wife revealed that he occasionally flew into or through clouds, albeit usually for short durations, in order to begin or complete his flights. In the case of the accident flight, the pilot had already delayed his departure 2 days, so he was highly motivated to begin the trip. Although the departure airport conditions were IMC, the pilot was aware that the forecast called for improved conditions towards his destination. In addition to his prior VFR operations into IMC, he did not hold a valid medical certificate and no current record of a required transponder inspection was located.

Ground-based radar and onboard global positioning system (GPS) data revealed that the airplane flew a ground track that included about eight 360-degree turns and three 180-degree turns, and that its altitude varied continuously between 200 feet and 1,600 feet above mean sea level. The GPS and radar data clearly indicated that the pilot became disoriented and was unable to methodically and safely extract himself from his predicament. FAA guidance regarding VFR flight into IMC cautioned pilots to minimize attitude changes and obtain appropriate assistance, including use of the autopilot.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.

View the official NTSB docket →