CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22 — Anderson, SC

What happened

The pilot receiving instruction performed several takeoffs and landings with a flight instructor aboard. The flight instructor then disembarked and told the pilot to perform three additional solo takeoffs and landings (to a full stop), which the instructor observed from the ground. According to the flight instructor, the pilot's first flight around the airport traffic pattern appeared normal and terminated in a full stop landing and taxi back to the runway for the next takeoff. The instructor stated that the airplane appeared to touch down normally during the second landing; however, shortly thereafter the engine power increased and the airplane began to ascend. The airplane then climbed at a steep angle, entered an aerodynamic stall, and impacted terrain to the left of the runway.

Review of data recorded by an onboard recoverable data module showed that as the airplane approached the runway during the landing, the stall warning activated and 1 second later the pilot increased engine power. As the engine power increased, the airplane began an unarrested turn to the left and the pilot retracted the airplane's flaps from the fully extended to the fully retracted position, which was contrary to the airframe manufacturer's published procedure for a balked landing. The data showed that after it reached an altitude of about 75 feet above ground level, the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall, and then rolled left while pitching down. The data recording ended before the airplane impacted terrain.

Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The installed whole airframe parachute system likely deployed during the postimpact fire; however, given the low altitude at which the aerodynamic stall occurred, it is unlikely that preimpact deployment of the system would have positively affected the outcome of the accident.

Review of the pilot's flight logs showed that he had accumulated more than 330 total hours of flight experience, including more than 220 hours in the accident airplane; however, he had not previously flown the accident airplane solo before the accident flight. Review of autopsy and toxicology test results showed no evidence of any preexisting condition that would have been expected to result in the pilot's incapacitation.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.