Mechanical & Engine Failure · NTSB ERA12FA395
REMOS ACFT GMBH FLUGZEUGBAU REMOS GX — Westminster, MD
| Date | June 15, 2012 |
| Location | Westminster, MD |
| Aircraft | REMOS ACFT GMBH FLUGZEUGBAU REMOS GX |
| Purpose of flight | Personal |
| Conditions | Day · Visual Meteorological Cond |
| Phase / occurrence | Prior to flight Aircraft maintenance event |
| Pilot age | 64 |
| Pilot total time | 3,250 hrs · High time |
| Time in type | 16 hrs |
| Fatalities | 1 |
Probable cause
NTSB findings
- Personnel issues-Task performance-Inspection-Preflight inspection-Pilot - C
- Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Flight control system-Elevator control system-Inadequate inspection - C
- Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Pitch control-Attain/maintain not possible - C
- Personnel issues-Task performance-Inspection-Preflight inspection-Pilot - F
- Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Forgotten action/omission-Pilot - F
What happened
The special-light sport airplane was designed with the ability to fold both wings back to facilitate storage and transportation. In addition, both wings and the horizontal stabilizer were removable. The pilot, who was also a mechanic, disassembled the airplane for storage during the winter. He subsequently reassembled it and completed a condition inspection. He then flew the airplane to an airport where a ballistic parachute system was installed. The pilot then flew the airplane to another airport and, the next day, departed on the accident flight with the intention of delivering the airplane to its owner.
About 20 minutes after takeoff, the airplane experienced a disconnected elevator, and the pilot attempted to fly to a nearby airport. The airplane was about 50 feet above the ground when it entered a sudden steep pitch downward and impacted the ground about 60 feet before the runway.
The airplane's flight controls were actuated by a series of push-pull rods. The respective push-pull rods for the left and right ailerons and elevator controls featured a "quick-fastener" to disconnect and reconnect the respective flight control. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the elevator quick-fastener was disconnected. Additional examination of the quick-fastener revealed that it contained some corrosion; however, it did not experience any failures and was capable of functioning as designed. In addition, the ballistic parachute system parachute was not activated, and the activation handle, which was mounted on the center console, was found secured with a padlock. The key for the padlock was found on a key ring with the ignition key, which remained inserted in the ignition switch.
The preflight checklist located in the pilot operating handbook required a check of the quick-fasteners and the ballistic parachute activation handle before every flight. Associated placards were also present in the cockpit. The pilot had at least three opportunities to identify an improperly secured elevator quick-fastener since he assembled the airplane; at least two of those opportunities occurred after the installation of the ballistic recovery parachute system. While it could not be determined if the pilot would have used the airplane's ballistic recovery parachute system, his failure to remove the padlock from the activation handle precluded the option of deploying the system during the accident flight.