Takeoff & Initial Climb · NTSB ERA14FA255

PIPER PA-28-140 — Fountain, FL

3 fatal Low-time pilot
DateMay 25, 2014
LocationFountain, FL
AircraftPIPER PA-28-140
Purpose of flightPersonal
ConditionsDay · Visual Meteorological Cond
Phase / occurrenceTakeoff Miscellaneous/other
Pilot age36
Pilot total time148 hrs · Low time
Time in typeUnknown
Fatalities3, 1 serious

Probable cause

The pilot's decision to depart from a soft runway with a tailwind and toward obstructions, and his failure to follow the manufacturer's recommended procedures for the takeoff. Contributing to the accident were the degradation of airplane and engine performance due to the high density altitude and the pilot's failure to properly configure the airplane's carburetor heat.

NTSB findings

  • Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Decision making/judgment-Pilot - C
  • Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of policy/procedure-Pilot - C
  • Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Temp/humidity/pressure-High density altitude-Effect on operation - F
  • Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of equip/system-Pilot - F
  • Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Wind-Tailwind-Effect on operation

What happened

The pilot was conducting a local personal flight in the airplane with three passengers onboard. He was departing from a turf and sand-covered runway that had a usable length of 2,600 ft. Although a relatively clear area was located beyond one end of the runway, the pilot elected to depart in the opposite direction toward a heavily forested area with trees that were about 70 ft tall. After a takeoff run requiring about half of the runway's available length, the airplane began climbing at an abnormally steep angle. The airplane climbed above the trees at the departure end of the runway, stopped climbing, rolled to the right, descended into the trees, and impacted the ground. A post-impact fire consumed the majority of the airplane. Examination of the wreckage at the accident site revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.

Review of video recorded both onboard and from outside the airplane showed that the pilot did not use the manufacturer's recommended procedure for a takeoff from a turf (soft) runway with obstacles ahead. The procedure called for 25 degrees of flaps, and the pilot used no flaps. Further, the procedure called for the pilot to raise the nose wheel off the ground as soon as possible, take off at the lowest possible airspeed, and accelerate to 78 mph before climbing; the pilot did none of these steps. The video also showed that the pilot elected to depart with a slight prevailing tailwind. While the estimated velocity of the tailwind was only 3 knots, this tailwind may have increased the airplane's takeoff distance by as much as 15 percent. Additionally, the calculated density altitude of 1,900 ft resulted in an estimated additional 20 percent increase in the takeoff distance and an estimated 10 percent reduction in rate of climb once the airplane was airborne.

The video showed that, during the takeoff, the engine tachometer indicated an rpm of about 2,000, which was less than the published minimum static rpm of 2,325 for the engine at its maximum throttle setting. While the accuracy of the tachometer's calibration could not be verified due to damage sustained during the accident, one potential cause for this discrepancy was the position of the carburetor heat selector handle. Video and statements from the airplane's owner suggest that the pilot had left the selector in an intermediate position, although the appropriate position for the takeoff phase of flight was the off position. Taking off with the selector in an intermediate position would potentially result in a loss of engine performance consistent with that observed on the tachometer.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.

View the official NTSB docket →