Cessna 335 — Fort Lauderdale, FL

What happened

The pilot and pilot-rated passenger were planning to conduct a repositioning flight. Shortly after takeoff, a video depicted white smoke trailing the airplane from the left engine. Subsequently the flight advised the tower controller that there was a fire in the left engine and the airplane was observed turning to the left to return to the airport. While maintaining controlled flight with the landing gear retracted and the left propeller in an unfeathered position, the airplane clipped the roof of a building adjacent to the airport, impacted the ground about 67 knots ground speed, and came to rest after impacting another building. A postimpact fire ensued. At ground impact, the left and right propellers were rotating about 900 rpm and 2,700 rpm, respectively. Postaccident examination of the left engine revealed detonation damage to several pistons, and the rod-oil gauge and cap assembly was not attached to the engine. Examination of the oil filler breather assembly revealed contact marks consistent with the rod-oil gauge and cap assembly coming out. There was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the right engine, propeller, or propeller governor.

Although the flight reported a fire in the left engine compartment to air traffic control, and the video showed trailing smoke, it is likely the left engine’s damaged pistons allowed the crankcase to become pressurized and the missing rod-oil gauge and cap assembly allowed oil to exit the engine and contact either the exhaust or turbocharger exhaust duct, resulting in the smoke.

Although the left propeller and propeller governor were heat damaged, there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of either that would have precluded feathering of the propeller blades. The pilot's failure to feather the left propeller following the partial loss of left engine power resulted in a negative climb performance. Had the pilot feathered the left propeller following the partial loss of engine power, it is likely that a positive rate of climb could have been attained.

The airplane had been flown once in the last several years before the accident pilot purchased it several months before the accident. Maintenance records located within the wreckage at the accident site revealed the airplane was deemed unairworthy during an annual inspection 6 months before the accident. The accident pilot then attempted to obtain a ferry permit for the airplane twice from the FAA; however, the FAA inspector did not approve the request due to maintenance discrepancies that were noted during his ramp inspection. After the second denial for a ferry permit, the pilot requested assistance from another maintenance facility. That facility initiated an inspection on the airplane; however, they stopped the inspection after over 100 discrepancies were noted, 9 of which were associated with the left engine. Acquaintances of the pilot stated that progress was made fixing the airplane over the next several months, although problems were still noted as recently as 3 weeks before the accident. The pilot reported that the costs of parking the airplane and his flights to and from where the airplane was located were mounting. On the morning of the accident, the pilot performed engine runs on the airplane and had borrowed some tools, although it could not be determined what maintenance, if any, he performed.

The pilot’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain a ferry permit, the most-recent list of discrepancies identified by a maintenance facility during their inspection, and the fact that the airplane did not pass its annual inspection clearly indicated the airplane was not airworthy. The pilot's desire to reposition the airplane due to mounting costs likely influenced his decision to fly the unairworthy airplane.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.