AEROPRO CZ A220 — Grafton, WV

What happened

The pilot took delivery of his newly assembled special light sport airplane a few days before the accident and received about 5 hours of instruction in the airplane. On the morning of the accident, he departed on the cross-country flight to his home airport after indicating to the mechanic and flight instructor who assisted with the airplane’s delivery and transition training that he was going to “scud run.” After stopping for fuel en route, the pilot departed to continue the flight.

According to automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data, for the first 5 minutes after takeoff, the airplane appeared to be performing a normal en route to cruise climb, but, when the airplane reached about 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the climb rate increased considerably. For the next 2 to 3 minutes, the airplane climbed at an accelerated rate, its groundspeed slowed, and the course heading deviated to the left and right. During the final 10-15 seconds of data, the airplane completed a 180°, rapidly descending left turn. The final reported position showed the airplane at 4,300 ft msl, about 1/4 mile from the accident site.

The condition and orientation of the wreckage indicated that the airplane impacted terrain in a steep and rapid descent. The wreckage was heavily fragmented and further damaged by a postcrash fire. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of a preimpact mechanical malfunction. Remnants of the whole airframe parachute system were not identifiable; whether the pilot attempted to activate the system could not be determined based on the available information.

Review of weather conditions indicated that the airplane likely entered an overcast cloud layer and instrument meteorological conditions around 3,000 ft msl and remained in those conditions for the entire climb to a maximum altitude of about 5,500 ft msl. In the cloud layer, conditions were conducive to the development of light-to-moderate rime airframe icing. The overcast layer of clouds likely had tops near 11,500 ft msl, so it is unlikely that the pilot entered visual flight rules (VFR) conditions above the cloud layer. Several weather observations and forecasts available to the pilot before departure called for these conditions. Although there was no evidence that the pilot obtained an official weather briefing, statements made by the pilot on the morning of the accident indicated that he was aware of the poor weather conditions and that he intended to continue VFR flight to his destination regardless of the forecast conditions. The pilot was instrument rated and current; however, the airplane was neither certified nor equipped for flight in instrument or icing conditions.

It is likely that the pilot was attempting to maintain control of the airplane in instrument meteorological conditions after accumulating structural icing that degraded the aerodynamic characteristics of the airplane. In addition, the pilot may have experienced erroneous flight instrument indications due to an icing-induced pitot-static system blockage. These factors indicate that the pilot likely lost control of the airplane after his continued VFR flight into instrument meteorological and icing conditions and subsequently entered a steep descent and spiral from which he did not recover.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.