Flugzeugproduktions-und Vertri EA 300/L — Four Corners, CA

What happened

The commercial pilot and passenger departed in the aerobatic airplane to an area established by the operator for accomplishing aerobatic maneuvers. Although operating as a flight training company, the operator described itself as an "extreme aviation attraction," providing a series of aviation-related experiences that included aerobatics, simulated air combat, and flight training, during which passengers had the opportunity to fly the airplane. The accident flight was a 25-minute-long "Top Gun" experience, which incorporated aerobatics, high-g maneuvers, and a low-level bombing run simulation.

Radar data revealed that the airplane flew to the standard practice area while performing the maneuvers. About that time, witnesses observed the airplane performing aerobatic maneuvers, then watched the airplane descend to the ground. One witness stated that he could see the airplane spiraling down behind a ridge. Another, who was closer to the accident site, stated that the airplane appeared to be descending at a rapid rate. He then heard popping sounds as the airplane passed behind a ridge and impacted the ground. Another witness, who was familiar with the aerobatic operations in the area, stated that the airplane appeared to be flying more aggressively than usual.

An accurate analysis of the final stages of the flight could not be derived due to the sample rate of the radar data relative to the airplane's rapid aerobatic movements.

An aft-facing onboard camera, mounted in front of the passenger was recording throughout the entire flight. The video revealed that the airplane was performing aerobatic maneuvers for about 7 minutes with both the pilot and passenger manipulating the controls. After the pilot completed a tumble maneuver, the airplane began to regain altitude. The passenger then moved his hands away from the flight controls and appeared to be bracing his arms against the sides of the airframe in anticipation for an aerobatic maneuver. The airplane then pitched up and rolled right, and then rolled left while the pilot made a "whooping" sound, as the airplane transitioned into an inverted spin. The passenger experienced negative g forces and reached up with his right arm up to secure the headphones that were pulling away from his head. The maneuver progressed, and its direction of rotation then reversed, until the airplane transitioned into an attitude such that only the sky was visible in the canopy.

The wind noise began to increase, and a gap began to appear at the interface between the canopy frame and fuselage, indicating that the airplane was approaching its never exceed speed. The passenger then began to aggressively be rocked from side to side; however, the sun could be seen gradually transitioning across the canopy, indicating the airplane was no longer tumbling and its attitude had stabilized. Up until this point, the passenger appeared to be enjoying the flight, but his facial expression changed, and he looked down and reached forward with his right hand. At that moment, the pilot activated the canopy release handle and the canopy opened. The camera was ejected, and continued to record as it descended to the ground, capturing the airplane collide with terrain 6 seconds later.

The violent rocking movement experienced by the passenger in the final seconds did not correspond to the gradual movement of the sun in the canopy, and was likely a result of the pilot applying rapid control inputs, possibly to the rudder, in an attempt to regain airplane control. The pilot released the canopy very shortly after the rocking movements began, so it is likely that he quickly deduced that recovery was not possible and that a bailout was necessary. The collision with terrain happened so fast after canopy release that a successful bailout was unlikely. Both occupants' seat belts were found in the latched and locked positions, further indicating that they did not have enough time to egress the airplane. Likewise, both occupants were wearing parachutes, neither of which had been deployed.

The video did not reveal any evidence of bird strike, fire, canopy failure, or flight control separation, and the passenger appeared to be conscious throughout the entire recording. Sound spectrum analysis revealed that the engine was operating within its normal operating speed range prior to the canopy opening.

The passenger's seatbelt harness was loose throughout the flight, and he could be seen moving up, down, and forward throughout the maneuvers, with particularly accentuated movement during the maneuver leading up to the accident. The position of his feet during the final maneuver could not be determined, however, inadvertent flight control interference could not be ruled out as he braced himself against the effects of the negative g-forces while secured with a loose seatbelt.

The debris field and wreckage distribution indicated that the airplane impacted the ground in a near-vertical attitude at high speed. The airplane was heavily fragmented during the impact, but remnants of all flight control surfaces were found within the immediate vicinity of the accident site.

The airplane had recently been purchased by the operator, and although it was about 8 years old, it had very low total flight time. Post impact examination did not reveal any anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation; however, due to the extensive damage sustained during impact, such anomalies could not be ruled out.

The airplane was subject to two service bulletins (SB) pertaining to the flight controls, neither of which had been performed. The first required replacement of the rudder cable to prevent premature failure, however the airplane's rudder cable did not display evidence of failure in the area documented by the SB. The other SB required the addition of a safety clamp to the transponder after a report that a transponder had slid out of its rack and jammed against the pilot control stick during aerobatic maneuvers. It could not be determined if the transponder had moved during the accident flight and inhibited the control stick.

Federal Aviation Regulations do not require compliance with SB's for aircraft operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.

Due to the physical trauma to the occupants, it was not possible to confirm or eliminate preexisting natural diseases that may have occurred before the accident. No samples definitively attributed to the pilot were available for toxicological testing, and only limited samples were available from the passenger.

Federal Aviation Regulations require commuter and on-demand operators to be appropriately certificated under 14 CFR Part 135; as such, their operations, pilots, and aircraft are subject to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations and oversight that exceed that of Part 91 operations. Part 135 also prohibits passengers from manipulating the flight controls, and FAA guidance generally does not allow anyone operating under Part 91 to advertise their services, however, exceptions exist for flight training.

The operator presented itself as a 14 CFR Part 61 flight school, and although they did provide upset recovery and tailwheel endorsement flight training and all the company pilots held flight instructor certificates, the vast majority of customers (including the accident passenger) did not hold any type of pilot certificate, and purchased flights for the aerobatic and air combat experience. Further, the operator's facilities were outfitted with equipment to host parties, including a bar, dart boards, pool tables, and basketball hoops. The company's website and sales literature was clearly directed toward the adventure and experience side of the business and contained numerous references to sightseeing. The operator employed a marketing director and actively advertised its services, often to groups, for corporate events and birthday, retirement, and wedding celebrations. Very little of the advertising was related to traditional flight training.

The operator's president stated that he had conferred with the FAA and made attempts to identify the appropriate operations category, and it was on that basis that he had chosen to establish the company as a Part 61 flight school operation. Limited FAA oversight exists for Part 61 operations, and there are essentially no regulations specifically tailored for the certification and comprehensive oversight of the "adventure flight" category that the company was essentially operating under.

Therefore, by operating as a Part 61 flight training provider, the company was able to advertise its services, expose fee-paying passengers to high-risk flight profiles, while circumventing the regulations and oversight for operators who provide transportation for compensation or hire.

The operator was involved in four other accidents in the previous 3 years, one of which resulted in two fatalities, and one of which was never reported to the NTSB, although it was required to be based upon the damage sustained to the airplane. Additionally, the operator was involved in two FAA enforcement actions during the same period, all involving incidents with passengers on board. In one case, a pilot's certificate was suspended for careless and reckless flying. In another, the FAA concluded that the pilot was likely acting carelessly and sanctioned him with safety awareness counselling.

Review of onboard video footage from the accident pilot's previous flights revealed that, although considered to be a mentor and conservative in nature by his colleagues, the pilot routinely flew airplanes beyond their operating limitations (specifically their vertical acceleration, or g limitations) and at speeds very close to the never-exceed speed, all with passengers on board. Review of footage taken with other pilots revealed a company-wide pattern of disregard for the airplane's published operating limitations and the company's own policies regarding airspeed and g limitations. Because both the accident airplane and other airplanes in the company fleet had been flown beyond their rated g limits, they would have been required to undergo additional maintenance checks. There was no evidence that such checks had ever been performed on the accident airplane; as such, the airplane was likely unairworthy at the time of the accident.

Both the company's ineffective internal controls and their ability to operate in an environment where limited FAA oversight existed allowed these behaviors and violations to continue.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.