VFR into IMC · NTSB WPR19FA103

Cirrus SR22 — Farmington, NM

1 fatal
DateMarch 31, 2019
LocationFarmington, NM
AircraftCirrus SR22
Purpose of flightPersonal
ConditionsDay · Visual Meteorological Cond
Phase / occurrenceEnroute-cruise Loss of visual reference
Pilot age59
Pilot total time370 hrs · Building experience
Time in type100 hrs
Fatalities1

Probable cause

The noninstrument-rated pilot's continued visual flight rules flight into an area of forecast instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a subsequent loss of control.

NTSB findings

  • Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Decision making/judgment-Pilot
  • Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-(general)-Not attained/maintained
  • Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Ceiling/visibility/precip-Clouds-Effect on personnel
  • Personnel issues-Psychological-Perception/orientation/illusion-Spatial disorientation-Pilot

What happened

The noninstrument-rated pilot departed on a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country flight. About 25 minutes after takeoff, the airplane reached its highest altitude of 17,300 ft mean sea level (msl) and was approaching a line of precipitation and thunderstorms. About 20 minutes later, the airplane entered a descent at a rate of about 1,000 ft per minute. The airplane then leveled off at an altitude of about 8,575 ft msl (about 3,000 ft above ground level), about 1,000 ft below the predicted cloud base, and a short time later, the airplane transitioned to a right descending turn that continued until ground contact, reaching a descent rate of about 5,175 ft per minute. The debris field and fragmentation of the airplane was consistent with a high-speed, right-wing-low impact. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation, and there was no evidence of an inflight breakup. The airplane’s airframe parachute system was not deployed.

Analysis of weather information indicated that the airplane likely encountered a line of developing and expanding rain showers, with updraft and downdraft conditions, precipitation, and reduced visibility as the pilot likely descended to fly under the cloud bases. Due to the developing and expanding rain shower line, outflow boundaries and low-level wind shear conditions were likely present in the area at the accident time.

A convective SIGMET as well as AIRMETs for instrument flight rules conditions, mountain obscuration, and moderate icing were valid for the route of flight and in the area of the accident site at the accident time. When activating his flight plan, the pilot indicated to the weather briefer that he was aware of the AIRMETs; however, whether he was aware of the SIGMET was not determined based on the available information.

Although the pilot did not receive an official weather briefing, records suggest that he downloaded weather imagery three days before the flight. He had an active subscription to a commercial satellite weather service for the airplane, which was also equipped with multiple avionics devices capable of receiving and displaying weather information. Whether or to what extent the pilot accessed weather imagery in-flight could not be determined.

The reduced visibility and the pilot’s lack of experience in flight by reference to instruments provided conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the airplane’s descending turn, rapid descent, and high-speed impact with the ground were consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Given the available information, it is likely that the noninstrument-rated pilot encountered instrument meteorological conditions as he continued toward and subsequently attempted to fly below an area of rain shower and thunderstorm activity, and experienced spatial disorientation that resulted in a loss of airplane control.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.

View the official NTSB docket →