CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22 — Oxbow, OR

What happened

During a VFR flight, the non-instrument-rated pilot contacted air traffic control and requested flight following. The controller issued a discrete transponder code, and no additional communications were observed, and no services were provided.

A review of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that while en route, the airplane climbed to an altitude of 14,100 ft msl. The airplane then descended and maintained 13,900 ft msl for the next 6 minutes before making a sharp left turn from the north to west. ADS-B data indicated that after the left turn the remaining flight time was about 44 seconds.

Witnesses on the ground near the accident site reported hearing the airplane operating in the area and looked up in the direction of the sound. However, they could not see the airplane or the 4,500 ft peak of a nearby mountain, as they were obscured by clouds. Another witness observed the airplane descending rapidly through the clouds in a nose-down attitude, followed by impact in mountainous terrain. Another witness reported that nearly 6 minutes after the initial impact, an empty parachute could be seen descending through the clouds.

The accident site was in a location with clouds and areas of precipitation. Based on the meteorological information, clouds were likely present from 4,000 ft msl through 14,000 ft msl. Based on the accident airplane’s altitude of 13,900 ft msl, it likely stayed at or above the cloud tops and out of instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) until 0945, when it likely entered an area of cloud cover that contained conditions conducive to producing between a trace and moderate airframe icing. Icing can often be concentrated near the tops of the clouds.

The pilot generated and received a commercial weather briefing before takeoff. The weather forecast at that time called for instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions, mountain obscuration, and moderate icing to 14,000 ft msl. Additionally, the graphical forecast for aviation indicated a broken to overcast cloud cover, with cloud bases at 7,000 to 9,000 ft msl expected for the accident site location and cloud tops forecast at 17,000 to 18,000 ft.

Based on meteorological data, the accident airplane was likely in IMC and operating in conditions characterized by trace to moderate icing. According to the manufacturer’s pilot operating handbook (POH), flight into known icing conditions is prohibited.

Additionally, the POH indicated that the airplane’s velocity never exceed airspeed (VNE) was 201 KIAS, and the maximum demonstrated parachute deployment speed (VPD) was 133 KIAS. According to ADS-B data, when the airplane’s groundspeed was 205 kts, the calculated true airspeed was 235 kts and the calibrated airspeed (CAS) was 200 kts, which exceeded the manufacturer’s VPD.

Exceeding the manufacturer’s VPD likely resulted in the structural overload of the three-point harness straps that connected the airplane fuselage structure to the parachute canopy.

An editorial "what led to it / how to avoid it" analysis for this accident is generated separately and will appear here.